In the past I have taken the more or less conventional approach to such resolutions, realizing that the New Year was an important time to face deficiencies and respond to the urgent need for reform, both personally and professionally. This year, I make the usual resolutions: (I) I hereby solemnly resolve that I shall make shocking inroads into my waistline by giving up desserts, eating between meals, a cocktail before dinner, and maple syrup. (II) I further resolve that since the meek shall inherit the earth, they should be allowed to finish a sentence, even though I know what they are going to say, they are taking an interminable time to say it, and I already know the answer. (III) Furthermore, I resolve that some of my pet beliefs, such as that science needs more funding, that the space station is a colossal waste of money, and that the benefits of science far outweigh the deleterious side effects, will no longer be the subject ofinterminable tirades. Ofcourse, it is not my fault that I return to these subjects often; rather it is the fault of the politicians, the bureaucrats, and others who do not instantly see the wisdom of my words.
I have previously made such resolutions in deep sincerity with an exalted feeling ofselfsacrifice and moral purity, only to have the resolutions broken long before the year is out.
That disparity between the ease of stating a high moral ideal and the difficulty ofpreventing its slow deterioration is the fundamental problem of resolutions. That is why I have decided to reevaluate resolutions on the basis of achievability. The achievability principle is not unlike the uncertainty principle, involving a multiplication of probabilities-that is, the higher the moral standard is set, the quicker the decay to the previous standard of behavior.
Therefore, one has a choice between diminishing the moral goal or diminishing the period over which the moral behavior is to be sustained.
I have personally chosen in the current year to maintain the high level of my goals, but have picked 1 January to 15 February as the period of time over which I am likely to maintain this incredible level ofachievement. It is my feeling that I will not be likely to starve to death and become morose in the period of one-and-a-half months following Resolution I. Moreover, by eschewing my favorite subjects of discourse (Resolution III), I will probably have very little to say, but on the other hand Resolution II will mean that I will have very little opportunity to say it. Thus considering the weakness of my moral fiber and the lofty idealism of my goals, 15 February sounds like a reasonable date.
In struggling through this catharsis, it strikes me that a similar approach might be worthwhile for governments and citizens. There is a tendency to use the rhetoric ofabsolute purity in naming civic goals-we must house all the homeless, provide health care to everyone, prevent war, and excel in international trade. The likelihood of implementing solutions to civic problems-raising taxes, working harder, lowering our standard of living is usually inversely proportional to the loffiness of the goal. Advocates of purity argue that goals must be extremely high in order to make any progress because compromise is inevitable. The danger of such an approach is that an impossible goal induces despair and the feeling that we are getting nowhere. Possibly setting achievable resolutions, ones for which we expect a high level of achievement for a short time (viewed as an educational experiment) or less lofty levels achievable for a longer time, may actually help societies as well as individuals. For example, a health care plan that provides everyone with the same level of coverage is probably not achievable, but one that narrows the currently unacceptable range of coverage between our poor and wealthy citizens is achievable.
It is true that high resolutions of government require cooperation from the other
